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This paper uses a detailed literature review and an empirical analysis of three models to
assess the links among inﬂation and survey measures of long- and short-term expectations. In
the ﬁrst approach, we jointly estimate a model of inﬂation, survey expectations and monetary
policy, where each is a function of a common time-varying inﬂation trend. In the estimates,
long-term expectations track closely the unobserved trend that is an important factor in inﬂation
dynamics, implying that changes in long-run expectations can lead to persistent movements in
inﬂation. In the second approach, we estimate a time-varying parameter VAR with stochastic
volatility. This model relaxes the cross-equation and constant parameter restrictions from the
ﬁrst model. Impulse response analysis shows a relatively stable relationship between inﬂation
and survey measures of inﬂation, although with some modest changes consistent with improved
anchoring of long-term expectations. Finally, we rely on a conventional VAR framework in-
corporating several macroeconomic variables, including both short- and long-term measures of
expected inﬂation. In these estimates, shocks to either measure of expectations lead to a rise in
the other measure and some limited pass-through to inﬂation. Shocks to inﬂation cause both
short- and long-term expectations to rise. Other factors such as monetary policy, economic
activity, and food price inﬂation also a ect expectations and inﬂation.
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In the conventional New Keynesian model with rational expectations, current inﬂation
is a function of the expected inﬂation rate next period and a measure of resource
utilization. Monetary policy anchors short- and long-run expectations by responding
aggressively to movements in current inﬂation.1 In this framework, the relationships
among inﬂation, short-run expectations, and long-run expectations are precise, where
each is a function of fundamental shocks impinging on the economy, as opposed to
expectational shocks. As a result, short- and long-run expectations generated by the
model are redundant. That is, in the New Keynesian context there is no need for the
central bank that responds aggressively to inﬂation to separately monitor inﬂation
expectations in addition to actual inﬂation. In practice, however, measures of short-
and long-run expectations are not usually considered redundant, even if one has a
good forecasting model of inﬂation.
Accordingly, this paper assesses the additional information that expectations data
may convey, and what inﬂuences expectations. More speciﬁcally, we consider the
following questions.
1. How do expectations inﬂuence inﬂation? Do the roles of short-run and long-run
expectations di er?
2. What inﬂuences expectations? That is, how do expectations depend on past
inﬂation, the state of the economy, and monetary policy? How do long-run
expectations relate to short-run expectations?
3. What’s changed over time? Have the relationships among inﬂation and expec-
tations changed in recent years, making inﬂation and expectations more or less
anchored? What might account for any changes?
Our assessment begins with a detailed survey of the literature. We then proceed to
our own empirical analysis of these questions, based on three di erent time series mod-
els and survey measures of short- and long-term inﬂation expectations from 1981:Q3
to 2008:Q2. Each model addresses a di erent aspect of the relationship between in-
ﬂation and expectations. The ﬁrst model uses survey data to extract a measure of
survey participants’ view of trend inﬂation. The second model assesses the stability
of the relationship between inﬂation and survey measures. The third model addresses
what factors move expectations and how expectations impact inﬂation.
More speciﬁcally, under the ﬁrst approach, we jointly estimate a model of inﬂa-
tion, survey expectations and monetary policy. This approach combines elements
1That is, monetary policy reacts su ciently aggressive to inﬂation so as to yield a unique bounded
equilibrium.
1from Kozicki and Tinsley (2006) and Kiley (2008b) by specifying inﬂation and the
interest rate as a function of a common time-varying inﬂation trend. The trend can
be thought of as a measure of the forecaster’s perception of the central bank’s implicit
inﬂation goal. Cross-equation restrictions impose that survey measures conform, up
to an error, to forecasts from the process governing inﬂation. Shifts in the trend then
a ect actual inﬂation, short-run expectations, long-run expectations, and the interest
rate. The model estimates reveal that long-term expectations track closely the unob-
served inﬂation trend. Consequently, even small movements in long-term expectations
convey important information regarding survey participants’ views of trend inﬂation,
which is an important determinant of inﬂation dynamics. In turn, movements in
long-term expectations are associated with persistent changes in inﬂation.
The second approach relaxes the constant parameter and cross-equation restric-
tions by estimating a time-varying VAR with stochastic volatility. The speciﬁcation
is similar to Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Clark and Nakata (2008), except we in-
clude short- and long-term expectations. Coe cient estimates and impulse response
analysis show a relatively stable relationship between inﬂation and survey measures
of inﬂation, but with some evidence of modestly increased anchoring of long-term
expectations. Shocks to long-term expectations produce signiﬁcant, commensurate
increases in short-term expectations and inﬂation. Shocks to short-term expectations
produce smaller, sometimes insigniﬁcant increases in long-term expectations and in-
ﬂation. Shocks to inﬂation generate a temporary rise in short-term expectations and
a small rise in long-term expectations. In addition, measures of volatility of expecta-
tions and core inﬂation have declined substantially throughout the sample period.
Given the stability of the relationship between inﬂation and expectations, the third
approach moves to a conventional VAR framework incorporating several macroeco-
nomic variables. The approach is similar to Leduc, Sill and Stark (2007), except we
embed long-term inﬂation expectations in addition to short-term expectations and use
some disaggregated elements of the CPI. This model, too, relaxes the cross-equation
restrictions incorporated in our ﬁrst model. We ﬁnd that shocks to either measure
of expectations lead to a rise in the other measure and some limited pass-through to
inﬂation. Shocks to inﬂation, or even just food price inﬂation, cause both short- and
long-term expectations to rise. Shocks to monetary policy eventually lower short-
and long-term expectations, although only temporarily.
Overall, based on a literature survey and our own evidence, we suggest the fol-
lowing answers to the questions listed above.
1. Expectations are an important force in inﬂation dynamics, with long-run expec-
tations, which are tantamount to trend inﬂation, more important than short-run
expectations. A wide range of prior studies have found a key role for survey-
based expectations in inﬂation dynamics. Our own estimates yield the same.
In our initial state-space framework, trend inﬂation, which is essentially equiva-
2lent to the long-run inﬂation expectation, receives greater weight in the equation
determining short-run inﬂation dynamics than lagged realizations of inﬂation.
In our VAR estimates, shocks to expectations (particularly long-term expecta-
tions) result in some pass-through to actual inﬂation.
2. Existing research and our own evidence indicate that inﬂation expectations re-
spond to a range of variables, including past inﬂation, the state of the economy,
and monetary policy actions. In our VAR analysis, innovations to CPI inﬂation
pose the greatest risk to keeping short- and long-term expectations anchored.
Short-term expectations respond more sharply than do long-term expectations.
Shocks to food price inﬂation, economic activity, and monetary policy also move
expectations.
3. A range of studies suggest inﬂation and expectations are probably better an-
chored today than 30 years ago. However, drawing on prior research and our
own results, it is less likely than a change has occurred in the past 25 years.
However, even in the past 25 years, the volatility of expectations and trend in-
ﬂation has fallen, and some evidence indicates that trend inﬂation has become
a relatively smaller source of volatility in inﬂation. While these changes imply
a smaller role for trends and long-run expectations in inﬂation movements, they
are consistent with improved anchoring of inﬂation. Most explanations o ered
to date focus on changes in the behavior of monetary policy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed literature review.
Section 3 describes the data used in our empirical analysis. Sections 4 through 6
present results from our three models, in sequence. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Survey
We organize our survey around the two broadest questions of interest: (1) how do
expectations inﬂuence inﬂation, and (2) what inﬂuences expectations — that is, how
do expectations depend on past inﬂation, economic activity, and monetary policy
actions? For each of these questions, we also consider: (a) how long-run and short-
run expectations relate, (b) what, if anything, has changed over time, and (c) what
might have caused any changes. In the case of the inﬂuence of expectations on
inﬂation, we ﬁrst organize the literature into those portions that use explicit (survey)
measures of expectations and those that use a time-varying trend of inﬂation instead
of (or, in one case, in addition to) an explicit measure of expectations. We further
group the evidence on question (1) into studies based on (i) reduced form/structural
VAR analysis and (ii) DSGE or New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) analysis.
In the case of question (2), we simply group the evidence into studies based on (i)
3reduced form/structural VAR analysis and (ii) analysis of inﬂation compensation.
We conclude the section with a brief summary of what are, in our assessment, broad
issues warranting further research.
In the interest of brevity, our survey focuses on work with inﬂation and expecta-
tions, omitting a wide array of other work of some relevance to some of the issues.
For example, as will become clear below, the role of expectations in the inﬂation
process bears on the persistence of inﬂation. In our review, we focus on that part
of the persistence literature that examines the role of expectations or time-varying
trends in the persistence of inﬂation, and omit those that do not explicitly consider
expectations or time-varying trends.
2.1 How do expectations inﬂuence inﬂation? Short-run ver-
sus long-run expectations? What has changed over time,
and why?
2.1.1 Evidence from using survey-based measures of expectations
A number of studies using reduced-form time series models or structural VARs have
found that survey measures of expectations play a key role in the dynamics of inﬂa-
tion. Leduc, Sill, and Stark (2007) add eight-month ahead inﬂation expectations to
an otherwise conventional macroeconomic VAR and examine the roles of shocks to
expectations, monetary policy, ﬁscal policy, and oil prices in accounting for the sharp
rise in inﬂation in the 1970s. They report that, prior to 1979, shocks to inﬂation
expectations had essentially permanent e ects on both inﬂation and expectations.
Since 1979, however, the impacts of expectations shocks have been temporary. Ex-
pectations shocks continue to impact inﬂation, but die out relatively quickly. The
change across samples appears to be associated with monetary policy: prior to 1979,
the real federal funds rate initially declined in response to the expectations shock, but
since 1979 the real rate has risen signiﬁcantly in response to expectations shocks.2
Clark and Nakata (2008) use a time-varying parameter VAR in the change in long-
run expectations, inﬂation less long-run expectations, economic activity, and the funds
rate less long-run expectations to examine whether inﬂation and expectations have
become better anchored over time. In their framework, long-run expectations play a
central role in driving inﬂation dynamics. Reduced-form coe cient estimates indicate
that the inﬂuence of expectations on inﬂation is modestly higher now than 20 or so
years ago. Impulse response estimates show that, compared to 20 or more years ago,
inﬂation and expectations appear to be slightly better anchored. Shocks to inﬂation
2Using a di erent data set and sample period, Choy, Leong, and Tay (2006) obtain qualitatively
similar results from a similar framework, except shocks to expectations account for a smaller fraction
of the variance of inﬂation than in Leduc, Sill, and Stark (2007).
4die out slightly faster and produce less of an increase in long-term expectations.
Nonetheless, counterfactual analysis indicates that the relatively low volatility of core
inﬂation and long-run expectations in the past decade or two is largely due to smaller
shocks to inﬂation and expectations, rather than changes in other model coe cients.
Canova and Gambetti (2008) use VAR models (both constant and time-varying
parameter speciﬁcations) to examine the predictive content of one-year ahead ex-
pectations for inﬂation. Granger causality tests and parameter estimates indicate
expectations have consistently had predictive content for inﬂation in data for 1960
through 2005. Demertzis, Marcellino, and Viegi (2008) use bivariate VARs in inﬂation
and long-run expectations (both constant and time-varying parameter speciﬁcations)
to assess whether the anchoring of inﬂation and expectations has changed over time.
Their coe cient estimates and impulse responses indicate the anchoring of inﬂation
and expectations has improved over time.
Some related models or analyses also give long-run expectations a key role in inﬂa-
tion dynamics. Most notably, long-run expectations are a key determinant of inﬂation
behavior in the FRB/US model. Historically, long-run expectations in FRB/US were
typically based on forecasts from simple VARs.3 Today, though, long-run inﬂation
expectations in the model are measured with survey data.4 Long-run expectations
also play a key role in inﬂation dynamics in the reduced-form Phillips curve used by
Macroeconomic Advisers (2007), which relates changes in core inﬂation to lags and
to the di erential between core inﬂation and long-run expectations.
A number of studies estimate some form of a NKPC using expectations measured
with survey data, often for the purpose of assessing the role of forward-looking ex-
pectations vs. backward-looking forces.5 A general theme that emerges from this
literature is that expectations are an important factor in driving inﬂation dynam-
ics, though the extent varies across studies. The estimates in Roberts (1995, 1997)
and Brissimis and Magginas (2008) indicate that, with expectations measured with
surveys, the NKPC with purely-forward looking expectations ﬁts the data reason-
ably well, without a need for backward-looking terms. However, Kozicki and Tinsley
(2002), Adam and Padula (2003), and Nunes (2006) report that a purely forward-
looking model does not ﬁt the data as well as a model with both forward-looking
survey expectations and backward-looking components.6
3See Brayton, et al. (1997).
4See Mishkin (2007).
5We abstract from a long literature estimating the NKPC with actual future inﬂation instead
of survey expectations, in which the key issue is what is required to account for the persistence of
inﬂation. See Kiley (2008b) for a recent example, and Kiley (2008b) and Brissimis and Magginas
(2008) for recent literature reviews.
6One issue in this literature that could lead to some di erences across studies is the treatment
of revisions to inﬂation data. Roberts (1995, 1997) uses CPI data, which aren’t revised. Brissimis
and Magginas (2008) use data on the GDP deﬂator, but take some care to match up their measure
of actual inﬂation with the varying data vintages reﬂected in the survey expectations. The other
52.1.2 Evidence using a econometric estimates of a time-varying inﬂation
trend
Several papers discuss the close conceptual correspondence between statistical esti-
mates of trend inﬂation and long-run inﬂation expectations.7 Trend inﬂation can be
thought of as the long-run forecast of inﬂation, which a long-run survey expectation
captures. In turn, movements in trend inﬂation are likely attributable to shifts in
the central bank’s inﬂation target, as in Cogley and Sbordone (2008). Of course, in
the United States, the Federal Reserve has no explicit inﬂation target. Instead, the
inﬂation goals of policy are implicit in its actions and public communication. In a
series of papers, Kozicki and Tinsley (see, e.g., Kozicki and Tinsley (2006)) argue
that trend inﬂation provides a measure of private sector perceptions of the implicit
inﬂation goal of policy. Accordingly, research using a time-varying inﬂation trend is
closely related to research using a time-varying inﬂation target.
Many studies have used reduced-form time series models or structural VARs to
examine the importance of time-varying inﬂation trends in the dynamics of inﬂation.
In this work, the inﬂation trend plays an important role in inﬂation dynamics. Kozicki
and Tinsley (1998, 2001a,b, 2002) present evidence that inﬂation dynamics are best
captured by models with a time-varying trend, in which the trend reacts with a lag
to movements in actual inﬂation. Long-run forecasts of inﬂation from these models
correspond reasonably well with long-run expectations from surveys. In some of this
work, long-term bond yields are used along with data on inﬂation to help pin down
estimates of trend inﬂation. Using just the federal funds rate and a Taylor rule, Leigh
(2005) obtains a qualitatively similar estimate of an implicit inﬂation target.
Kozicki and Tinsley (2006) develop a VAR framework that explicitly links together
inﬂation, trend inﬂation (which they view as a measure of private sector perceptions
of the implicit inﬂation goal), and expectations. In this model, expectations (in their
analysis, one-year and 10-years ahead) are noisy indicators of forecasts of inﬂation
implied by an inﬂation model with a time-varying trend rate of inﬂation, which follows
a random walk process. Actual inﬂation and expectations provide indicators of the
unobserved trend rate of inﬂation. As the horizon increases, the inﬂation expectation
depends more on the inﬂation trend and less on actual past inﬂation. The model
estimates yield an inﬂation trend that is quite similar to the survey measure of the
long-run expectation. Chernov and Mueller (2008) use a similar model, expanded to
include bond yields.
A number of other studies have also found that trend inﬂation, modeled as a ran-
three studies mentioned also use GDP deﬂator data, but abstract from real time data and revision
issues, except that Kozicki and Tinsley (2002) report obtaining similar results in a shorter sample
in which data revisions should be less of an issue.
7For example, see Kozicki and Tinsley (2006), Mishkin (2007), and Cogley, Primaceri, and Sargent
(2008).
6dom walk, can account for much of the variation in actual inﬂation. For example,
Cogley and Sargent (2005), Cogley, Primaceri, and Sargent (2008), and Cogley and
Sbordone (2008) estimate VARs with time-varying parameters and a time-varying in-
ﬂation trend. Stock and Watson (2007) and Cecchetti, et al. (2007) estimate univari-
ate trend-cycle models of inﬂation. Kiley (2008a) estimates a bivariate trend-cycle
model of inﬂation, using total and core inﬂation together, with a common trend.
Across these studies, certainly, the magnitude of trend ﬂuctuations sometimes di ers
considerably. However, in all cases, trend inﬂation has changed signiﬁcantly over
time, and plays a key role in inﬂation dynamics. Based on a Phillips curve with a
time-varying inﬂation trend, Piger and Rasche (2006) conclude that inﬂation dynam-
ics are driven primarily by changes in trend, with relatively small contributions from
economic activity and supply shocks. Several studies that allow time variation in
the sizes of shocks to trend inﬂation — Piger and Rasche (2006), Stock and Watson
(2007), Cecchetti, et al. (2007), and Cogley, Primaceri, and Sargent (2008) — have
found that the trend component is considerably smaller in data for the last decade
or two than in prior years. Cecchetti, et al. (2007) go on to consider the relation-
ship between trend inﬂation and survey measures of long-run expectations, and ﬁnd
that Granger causality runs both directions: changes in expectations presage sub-
sequent movements in trend, while movements in trend also anticipate changes in
expectations.
A number of recent studies use DSGE-based models to examine the role of a time-
varying inﬂation trend or target in inﬂation dynamics. Ireland (2007) estimates with
1959-2004 data a DSGE model with a time-varying inﬂation target that is known to
the public. In one version, the target follows a simple random walk; in another, the
target is allowed to respond to supply shocks. While the model estimates suggest
the implicit target did move in response to supply shocks, the estimated targets from
the two models are quite similar. The estimates imply that changes in the implicit
target have accounted for a signiﬁcant portion of variation in inﬂation. Belaygorod
and Dueker (2005) obtain a qualitatively similar, although even more variable, target
with a DSGE model estimated for 1985-2004.
To assess the causes of the reduced volatility and persistence of inﬂation, Cogley,
Primaceri, and Sargent (2008) estimate a DSGE model with a time-varying inﬂation
target that is known to the public, for samples of 1960-79 and 1982-2006. The model-
based inﬂation target is qualitatively similar to the trend estimated from a VAR with
time-varying parameters, although probably more variable. Their estimates imply
that the reduced volatility and persistence of inﬂation is mostly due to a fallo  in
the volatility of the inﬂation target, with the increased responsiveness of monetary
policy to deviations of inﬂation from target making a smaller, but notable, contri-
bution.8 Note that, in such analysis, the change in inﬂation dynamics is typically a
8Based on DSGE model estimates for the 1983-2004 period, Benati and Surico (2008) ﬁnd that
changes in the policy reaction function alone (with a constant inﬂation target) can account for the
7change in reduced-form properties, rather than the structural NKPC. Emphasizing
the distinction, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2008) use a calibrated DSGE model (applied
to detrended inﬂation) to show that the decline in the reduced-form persistence of
inﬂation can be attributed to an increase in the responsiveness of monetary policy to
inﬂation and a decline in the relative size of technology shocks.
However, in light of the global nature of the upward and downward trends of
inﬂation in the 1970s and 1980s, Cecchetti, et al. (2007) note that it is likely di cult
to identify a global change in monetary policy preferences that could account for the
global synchronization of inﬂation trends. Nonetheless, the trends in inﬂation across
some countries seem to line up with systematic deviations from simple Taylor rules,
pointing to a role for changes in monetary policy preferences. Cecchetti, et al. (2007)
go on to use a simple DSGE model to assess what model features and changes over
time are necessary to account for the estimated changes in the univariate properties
of inﬂation. They conclude that the model requires very forward-looking agents and
very small shocks to monetary policy, more so in the past 20 years than in the prior
period. So their analysis, too, highlights the importance of expectations in inﬂation
dynamics.
Cogley and Sbordone (2008) consider in detail the implications of a time-varying
inﬂation trend for the form of the NKPC, developing and estimating an alternative
form of the model that does not require (as does most of the literature) that ﬁrms
not optimizing their prices in a given period index their prices to the inﬂation trend.
Based on trend estimates obtained from a VAR like that of Cogley and Sargent
(2005), they show that no indexation or backward-looking component is needed to
model inﬂation dynamics once changes in trend inﬂation are taken into account.9
To assess the sources of inﬂation persistence, Erceg and Levin (2003) consider a
calibrated DSGE model with a time-varying inﬂation target unobserved by the public,
about which the public learns through economic outcomes and policy actions. Their
results indicate that persistent target changes (and learning about the target) are
crucial to the dynamics of inﬂation, particularly to its persistence. Notably, in their
results, one-year ahead inﬂation expectations decline faster than does actual inﬂation
following a persistent (negative) shock to the inﬂation target.
Roberts (2007) also considers a DSGE model (partly calibrated and partly esti-
mated) with learning about just the unobserved inﬂation target, to determine whether
learning or backward-looking inﬂation dynamics (sticky inﬂation) can better account
reduced predictability of inﬂation. Primaceri (2006) ﬁnds that a model with policymakers learning
about the structure of the economy can entirely account for the rise and fall of inﬂation in the
post-war period; he reports that allowing potential breaks in the inﬂation goal do not alter this
ﬁnding.
9The estimated trend in Cogley and Sbordone (2008) is somewhat less variable than the estimate
in Cogley and Sargent (2005), but well within 90 percent credible sets.
8for the persistence of inﬂation. He concludes that allowing learning reduces the evi-
dence of sticky inﬂation, more so in the 1984-2004 period than the 1959-2003 period,
such that there is little evidence today of sticky inﬂation once learning about an im-
plicit target is taken into account. Here, as in other papers in the literature, time
variation in the inﬂation target (or trend) absorbs or explains a signiﬁcant portion of
the reduced-form persistence of inﬂation.
Milani (2006) estimates DSGE models with a time-varying inﬂation target, with
one version featuring rational expectations and the other version featuring learning
about the policy target and all other model coe cients. With rational expectations,
the estimated target is quite similar to Ireland’s (2007), showing considerable variation
over time. With learning, the estimated target is quite di erent, and even more
variable.
Overall, the research cited in this section points to a key role for survey-based
expectations in inﬂation dynamics. While there remains some debate about the im-
portance of forward-looking expectations versus backward-looking components in in-
ﬂation dynamics, an array of evidence shows that expectations or trend inﬂation are
a primary source of variation in inﬂation. In fact, in some work, incorporating survey
measures of expectations or trend inﬂation often substantially weakens or eliminates
the importance of backward-looking components of inﬂation (except any backward-
looking aspects captured in the survey expectation or the trend).
Less clear from extant work are distinct roles for short-term versus long-term
expectations: most studies use one or the other. As Kozicki and Tinsley (2006)
point out, as the horizon increases, expectations should become more reﬂective of
the perceived long-run goal of policy (or trend inﬂation) and less reﬂective of recent
movements in inﬂation. Therefore, in a reduced form sense, there may be scope
for short-run and long-run expectations to separately inﬂuence inﬂation dynamics.
However, there is little direct evidence of such distinct inﬂuences.
As to changes over time in the inﬂuence of expectations or trends on inﬂation,
the evidence generally suggests inﬂation has been better anchored in the past 20 or
so years than in the prior period, although some evidence suggests no change. Some
studies have found that shocks to expectations have less impact on inﬂation today
than in the past (e.g., Leduc, Sill, and Stark (2007)). Some evidence indicates that,
in a reduced form sense, the inﬂuence of expectations on inﬂation has increased (e.g.,
Clark and Nakata (2008)). However, the volatility of expectations and trend inﬂation
has clearly fallen, and some evidence indicates that trend inﬂation has become a
relatively smaller source of volatility in inﬂation (e.g., Stock and Watson (2007) and
Cogley, Primaceri, and Sargent (2008)). While such changes imply a smaller role for
trends and long-run expectations in inﬂation movements, they are consistent with
improved anchoring of inﬂation.
Of the limited work to date on the sources of these changes, most has focused on
9explanations relating to monetary policy. Some studies have found that the reduced
volatility and persistence of inﬂation is mostly due to a fallo  in the volatility of
an implicit inﬂation target (e.g., Cogley, Primaceri, and Sargent (2008)). Others
attribute changes in the behavior of inﬂation more to other changes in the conduct
of monetary policy (e.g., Benati and Surico (2008)). Still other studies highlight the
importance of learning by the public or the central bank in inﬂation dynamics and
changes over time in dynamics (e.g., Erceg and Levin (2003) and Roberts (2007)).
More generally, the learning-based framework sketched by Bernanke (2007) seems
like the most widely accepted approach to linking inﬂation to inﬂation trends and
long-run expectations. In practice, the structure of the economy is changing over
time and unknown to the public and the central bank. What is more, in the case of
the U.S., the implicit inﬂation goal of the central bank has not been known to the
public.10 Consequently, both the public and the central bank must engage in learning
over time, extracting from observed data on the economy signals about the structural
features of the economy and, in the case of the public, the central bank’s implicit
inﬂation goal. This learning process likely gives inﬂation expectations — potentially
at not only long but also short horizons — an explicit role in the structural dynamics
of the economy. One challenge, though, is to provide an interpretation of expectations
shocks. In this sort of model, are unexpected changes in expectations best attributed
to sunspots or omitted fundamentals (as in, e.g., Leduc, Sill, and Stark (2007))?
Are they simply manifestations of other structural shocks, such as to the unobserved
inﬂation goal?
2.2 What inﬂuences expectations? How do long-run expec-
tations relate to short-run expectations? What has changed
over time, and why?
A long literature has examined a very broad question about the determinants of
inﬂation expectations: are survey data rational or e cient forecasts of inﬂation, or do
surveys reﬂective some less than fully rational behavior (e.g., adaptive components)?11
In the interest of brevity, we will simply refer to a recent study, Croushore (2006),
which provides a good summary of the literature, and argues that inﬂation forecasts
appear to be rational once some econometric and data problems in past studies are
corrected.
10In recent years, though, public statements by some FOMC members have made clearer the
inﬂation objectives of those members. In addition, the FOMC’s decision in 2008 to extend the horizon
of forecasts provided to the public four times per year have probably provided more information on
the inﬂation goals of Committee members.
11Some other work examines the value of survey expectations in forecasting inﬂation out of sample.
Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2007) ﬁnd that, in recent data, survey measures of expectations provide
better forecasts of inﬂation than do a wide range of time series models.
10Related studies such as Roberts (1997, 1998), Carroll (2003), and Curtin (2005)
seek to assess the roles of rationality and adaptive behavior in inﬂation surveys.
Carroll (2003) develops a model in which consumer expectations adjust toward pro-
fessional forecasts, which are usually based on more information, because of the cost
and beneﬁt to consumers of acquiring information.12 In addition, studies such as
Lamont (2002) and Ottaviania and Sorensen (2006) have examined the behavior of
professional forecasters, to assess the incentives for forecasters to report something
other than an “honest,” objective forecast for strategic reasons, such as to manipulate
beliefs about the forecasters’ abilities.
van der Klaauw, et al. (2008) use individual-level responses to survey questions
to assess what prices consumers typically think of in responding to the University
of Michigan’s survey. They ﬁnd that question wording has a considerable impact on
what consumers consider in formulating an answer. For example, the conventional
Michigan questions about “prices in general” that yield the widely used Michigan
measures of inﬂation expectations tend to lead respondents to think about prices of
items they usually buy, or about item (e.g., gas) prices that have recently been rising.
In contrast, when asked (in supplemental questions developed by the authors, not
the standard Michigan survey questions) to instead report expectations for the ‘rate
of inﬂation’, consumers report thinking more about items most Americans purchase
or about the aggregate inﬂation rate. In addition, their expectations for the ‘rate of
inﬂation’ are less correlated with prices for food, gas, or other speciﬁc items.
Based on macroeconomic analysis, various studies have highlighted the depen-
dence of long-term inﬂation expectations on just past inﬂation. Kozicki and Tinsley
(2001a,b, 2002) show that long-term expectations seem to trail actual inﬂation. Cec-
chetti, et al. (2007) show that long-term expectations respond to past movements in
trend inﬂation. Because their estimate of trend is a function of past movements in
actual inﬂation, it follows that long-term expectations depend importantly on past
inﬂation.
A number of recent studies have used time series models to examine the inﬂu-
ences of inﬂation and other variables on medium- or long-term inﬂation expectations.
Leduc, Sill, and Stark (2007) present evidence on the expectations impacts of shocks
to oil prices, ﬁscal policy, monetary policy, and expectations, using 8-month ahead
inﬂation expectations. According to their estimates, shocks to oil prices, monetary
policy, and expectations all have signiﬁcant impacts on expectations. However, their
evidence may be read as suggesting that expectations are reasonably well anchored in
the 1979-2001 period. In that sample, oil price increases (shocks) cause both inﬂation
and short-term expectations to rise, inﬂation more so than expectations. Monetary
policy tightenings cause both inﬂation and short-term expectations to fall, inﬂation
12However, a recent evaluation of consumer expectations by Thomas and Grant (2008) ﬁnds
consumer expectations to be rational and e cient.
11more so than expectations. An expectations shock has only temporary e ects on
inﬂation. In contrast, in the 1952-79 period, a policy shock generates a price puz-
zle, with both inﬂation and expectations rising immediately after the unanticipated
tightening. And, in this sample, an expectations shock leaves the expected inﬂation
rate permanently higher.
Some aspects of their results suggest monetary policy has played a role in the
improved anchoring of inﬂation expectations: in the second sample, but not the ﬁrst,
policy tightens enough in response to an expectations shock to raise the real interest
rate. Other results make the evidence less clear: in the case of an oil price shock, the
real interest rate response is sharper in the second sample than the ﬁrst, even though
the oil price shock has a bigger impact on inﬂation in the second sample than the
ﬁrst.
Based on a similar analysis of impulse responses from a VAR including one-year
ahead survey expectations of inﬂation, Mehra and Herrington (2008) conclude that
inﬂation expectations have been better anchored since 1979 than before, with re-
spect to shocks to oil prices, commodity prices, inﬂation expectations, and inﬂation
itself. One of the sharpest changes has been in the impact of commodity prices on
inﬂation expectations — commodity shocks account for much less of the variation in
expectations since 1979 than before.
Clark and Nakata (2008) use a time-varying parameter VAR in long-run expec-
tations, inﬂation less long-run expectations, economic activity, and the funds rate
less long-run expectations to examine the inﬂuences of these variables on long-run
inﬂation expectations. In their impulse response estimates, shocks to inﬂation have
a statistically signiﬁcant impact on long-run expectations. However, the impact is
quantitatively small, more so now than 20 or so years ago. Counterfactual analysis
indicates that the incredible stability of long-run expectations in the past decade or so
is primarily the result of very small shocks to core inﬂation and expectations, rather
than changes in other model coe cients (and, therefore, monetary policy).
Kiley (2008b) couples (1) a Taylor rule with (2) learning about an unobserved
inﬂation target to estimate the impacts of monetary policy actions and the economy
on long-term inﬂation expectations. Learning means the public’s estimate of the
inﬂation target follows from extracting the signal from the random walk target process
and the Taylor rule. Kiley estimates the model by further assuming that the public
perception of the target can be measured directly from long-term survey expectations
(after removing the ﬁrst three years of data from the 10-year horizon). In estimates
from data for 1979-2004, inﬂation expectations respond signiﬁcantly to policy actions
(particularly, deviations of the actual funds rate from the Taylor rule-implied value),
economic activity, and inﬂation. However, as noted below in section 4, the impacts
are quantitatively small.
A number of recent studies have used data on inﬂation compensation from TIPS or
12far-forward nominal bond yields to assess the responsiveness of inﬂation expectations
to news in the economy (with news deﬁned as deviations of actual data releases
from market expectations).13 Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) show that far-
forward nominal yields respond to news on the economy. For example, a higher-than-
expected CPI or non-farm payrolls release tends to cause far-forward bond yields to
rise. Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson go on to show that, in a simple macroeconomic
model, allowing time variation in the central bank’s inﬂation target can explain the
behavior of interest rates. In this model, the target is a function of past inﬂation and
the past target; the public learns about the target from the actions of the central
bank.
Gurkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2006) show that, in U.S. data, both far-forward
nominal rates and inﬂation compensation respond to news on the economy. In data
for the United Kingdom, the same is true for data prior to the establishment of the
Bank of England’s independence, but not in data since then. In post-BOE inde-
pendence data for the U.K. and in data for Sweden, far-forward nominal rates and
inﬂation compensation do not respond to news. Similarly, in Beechey, Johannsen,
and Levin (2008), long-term inﬂation compensation responds to news in the U.S. but
not the Euro area; short-term compensation responds to news in both economies. All
of this evidence suggests that long-run inﬂation expectations (in particular, public
perceptions of the long-run goal of monetary policy) are not fully anchored in the
United States.
Finally, some studies have assessed the anchoring of inﬂation and inﬂation expec-
tations by examining how shocks to short-run TIPS compensation impact long-run
compensation. Potter and Rosenberg (2007) and Jochmann, Koop, and Potter (2008)
treat inﬂation and expectations as being anchored if pass-through from short-run to
long-run compensation declines as the horizon increases and contained if pass-through
is high inside the central bank’s comfort zone for inﬂation and low outside the comfort
zone. Jochmann, Koop, and Potter (2008) use a model (really, a class of models) that
allows pass-through to vary with time, with the level of short-run compensation, or
with deviations of compensation from a central value. Potter and Rosenberg (2007)
use a broadly comparable model. Both studies ﬁnd that shocks to short-term expec-
tations pass through to long-term expectations when inﬂation lays within a comfort
zone but not outside that zone. Therefore, expectations as measured by TIPS com-
pensation do not seem to be fully anchored.
Overall, existing research indicates that inﬂation expectations respond to a range
of variables: oil prices, commodity prices, past inﬂation, the state of the economy, and
13Note, though, that the ﬁndings in Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2008) might be seen as war-
ranting some caution in drawing strong conclusions on the behavior of U.S. inﬂation expectations
from TIPS compensation. Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright argue that inﬂation compensation is a bet-
ter indicator of inﬂation risks than the expected inﬂation rate. Similarly, D’Amico, Kim, and Wei
(2008) recommend caution in taking TIPS breakeven rates as measures of inﬂation expectations.
13monetary policy actions. A more limited volume of work shows that the responses
of short-run expectations are normally sharper than the responses of long-run expec-
tations. Similarly, some historical comparisons generally suggest expectations have
become better (but not completely) anchored, responding less than used to be the
case to various shocks in the economy. For example, while some evidence shows long-
run expectations respond to shocks to inﬂation or to monetary policy actions, the
impacts are now quantitatively small.
Of those studies that explicitly consider potential explanations for the improved
anchoring, most focus on the conduct of monetary policy (e.g., Leduc, Sill, and Stark
(2007) and Mehra and Herrington (2008)). However, Clark and Nakata (2008) ﬁnd
that the high stability of long-run inﬂation expectations in the past 10-20 years is
entirely attributable to smaller shocks to inﬂation and expectations; in their estimates,
changes in model coe cients (such as in monetary policy) seem to play no role. To this
point, no studies have undertaken a structural investigation of the improved anchoring
of expectations; existing structural investigations focus on actual inﬂation, without
explicit consideration of measures of inﬂation expectations (apart from trends).
2.3 Summary of areas for further research
As this review suggests, existing research has yet to fully or deﬁnitively answer a
number of questions about the behavior of inﬂation and inﬂation expectations. For
convenience, we provide below a listing of the questions that, in our assessment,
warrant further research.
1. What is the relative importance of forward-looking versus backward-looking
components in inﬂation dynamics?
2. What accounts for the fall in the volatility, persistence, and predictability of
inﬂation? Does the behavior of inﬂation expectations display the same changes?
If so, what accounts for any shifts in the behavior of expectations? What role
did monetary policy play, and which aspects of monetary policy — changes in
the implicit inﬂation goal or responsiveness of policy to inﬂation and the state
of the economy — were more important? Why were some of the changes in the
behavior of inﬂation global in nature?
3. To the extent the inﬂation goal of monetary policy varied over time, what drove
the changes? Are the forces the same as those that have been suggested as
explanations for shifts in the reaction of monetary policy to inﬂation and the
state of the economy?
4. For forecasting inﬂation, what accounts for the superiority of some survey ex-
pectations over model-based forecasts? What are the models missing, and can
14the gap be closed?
5. How do expectations impact inﬂation dynamics in a structural economic model
with learning and structural change? What are the implications for the conduct
of monetary policy?
6. What should policymakers make of movements in survey indicators of inﬂation
forecast uncertainty, or in dispersion across survey responses? For example,
if survey measures of long-term expectations show a pickup in uncertainty or
disagreement, does it necessarily mean the respondents have become more skep-
tical of the central bank’s commitment to long-term price stability? Does policy
need to react in some way?
7. Today, what determines or inﬂuences expectations, in microeconomic (measure-
ment) and macroeconomic terms?
8. In a structural economic model, is there a distinct role for short-term versus
long-term expectations? Do the data support a distinct role?
9. What is a shock to inﬂation expectations as it may be captured by a macroe-
conomic VAR — omitted fundamentals or sunspots?
10. What do TIPS yields say about the anchoring of inﬂation expectations, distin-
guishing inﬂation risk from point expectations?
11. Have the recent changes in the FOMC’s public communication e orts (e.g.,
more frequent publication of forecasts, and the extension of the forecast hori-
zon to three years) impacted the anchoring of inﬂation expectations? Might a
more explicit inﬂation goal impact anchoring? Would that goal need to take
a particular form to impact anchoring? Would the beneﬁts to the economy be
material?
Combining various approaches used in the literature described above, in the re-
mainder of the paper we focus on our own analysis of the relationships among inﬂation
and inﬂation expectations.
3 Data Description
In the interest of ensuring comparability between our measures of expectations and
inﬂation, we focus on actual inﬂation in the CPI and survey-based measures of CPI
15expectations, at a quarterly frequency.14 Our primary results are robust to measuring
actual inﬂation with the PCE price index. We obtained our raw data on the CPI, core
CPI, CPIs for food and energy, and federal funds rate from the Board of Governors’
FAME database.15 We obtained the Chicago Fed’s National Activity Index from the
Chicago Fed’s website.
For inﬂation expectations, we rely primarily on CPI forecasts — one and 10 years
ahead — from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF). We obtained both one-year ahead and 10-year ahead median fore-
casts of the CPI from the Philadelphia Fed’s web site. The one-year forecast as of
period t refers to a forecast of inﬂation from t + 1 through t + 4, made in the middle
of quarter t. The 10-year ahead forecast is a projection of the average inﬂation rate
over the next 10 years. Because the SPF 10-year forecast series does not begin until
1991:Q4, we spliced the source SPF series for 1991:Q4-2008:Q2 to a 1979:Q4-1991:Q3
series from Blue Chip. We use Blue Chip because its participants are conceptually
similar to those of the SPF and because, since 1991, the long-term forecasts reported
by Blue Chip and the SPF have been very similar.
We obtained Blue Chip forecasts of the average inﬂation rate over the next 10
years from hard copies of the Blue Chip Consensus.16 Because Blue Chip provides
long-term forecasts only twice per year, we linearly interpolated the series to the
monthly frequency, and then selected those observations in the months used by SPF
(February, May, August, and November) to ﬁll in our quarterly time series.17
We have also veriﬁed the robustness of our results to using median consumer
expectations from the University of Michigan’s survey.18 As highlighted in van der
14The timing of our estimation sample — 1982:Q3 through 2008:Q2 — reduces the importance
of methodological inconsistencies with historical CPI data. Historically, the biggest methodological
break in the CPI is the January 1983 change to a rental equivalence basis for housing costs. Our
estimation sample only includes two observations from 1982.
15We formed quarterly averages of the indexes and funds rate, as well as the CFNAI, as simple
averages within the quarter.
16We obtained a 10-year forecast by averaging the forecasts for 1-5 and 6-10 years ahead reported in
the Blue Chip Consensus. For 1979:Q4-1982:Q4 and 1983:Q4 (actually the months in these quarters
in which there are actual Blue Chip data), Blue Chip provides expectations for the GNP deﬂator,
but not the CPI. Because the CPI forecasts and deﬂator forecasts are very similar (sometimes the
same, sometimes very slightly di erent, without a consistent gap) in the few years in which CPI
forecasts ﬁrst become available, for these early source observations we ﬁll in the CPI forecasts with
deﬂator forecasts.
17Starting in 1983, the Blue Chip surveys always include the long-term forecasts in the months of
March and October. In the prior years, the surveys sometimes occurred in the months of May and
November.
18In the Michigan analysis, we used 12-month and 5-10 year ahead expectations. In the case of the
long-term expectations, which weren’t reported every month until April 1990, we obtained a full time
series by linearly interpolating between the observations available in the February 1975 to March
1990 period. In this interpolation, we used Hoey survey forecasts (provided by Sharon Kozicki) and
Blue Chip forecasts, both 5-10 years ahead, as indicators. We obtained the raw Michigan data from
16Klaauw, et al. (2008), measuring consumer inﬂation expectations poses a number of
issues (some described above in section 2.2). However, at least in the case of our
primary empirics, using consumer expectations yields results very similar to those
obtained with professional forecasts. Carroll (2003) develops a model in which it is
costly for consumers to acquire information, such that consumer expectations adjust
toward professional forecasts, which are usually based on more information.
4 A State-Space Approach with Time-Varying Trend
Inﬂation
We begin our analysis with a relatively restrictive model where inﬂation dynamics
are driven by an unobserved, time-varying trend and realizations of past inﬂation.
Changes in the inﬂation trend are attributable to changes in the implicit inﬂation
goal of monetary policy. Survey expectations reﬂect forecasts of inﬂation based on
past inﬂation, monetary policy actions, and the estimated trend. In this setup, ex-
pectations don’t directly drive inﬂation. Instead, they are observable measures that
reﬂect the true forces driving inﬂation, such as the unobserved trend. The frame-
work combines elements of the models used in Kozicki and Tinsley (2006) and Kiley
(2008b).
More speciﬁcally, the model in this section uses inﬂation, short- and long-term
survey expectations and the federal funds rate to extract an unobserved trend rate
of inﬂation. Inﬂation follows an autoregressive process with a time-varying trend
and survey expectations are modeled as the conditional expectations, plus noise, of
the inﬂation process at di erent horizons. This framework imposes a set of cross-
equation restrictions that ensures consistency between the process for inﬂation and
survey measures.
The approach is similar to Kozicki and Tinsley (2006), except for two key di er-
ences. First, we jointly estimate the process for inﬂation and monetary policy. The
beneﬁt of joint estimation is that it allows two channels to impact long-term inﬂation
expectations. The ﬁrst channel is backward-looking, where high realizations of past
inﬂation may raise long-term expectations. The second channel is forward-looking,
where deviations to the estimated monetary reaction function can cause forecasters
to re-evaluate their long-term inﬂation forecasts. Kiley (2008b) uses just a reaction
function and long-run inﬂation expectations to extract estimates of an unobserved in-
ﬂation target. The second di erence relative to Kozicki and Tinsley (2006) is our data
sample and treatment of missing data. Kozicki and Tinsley use a longer, monthly
sample that includes an extended period in which long-run expectations are not avail-
able, which requires a generalization of the state-space estimation to allow missing
the Board of Governors’ FAME database.
17data. We instead focus on a shorter, quarterly sample over which both our expecta-
tions series are always available.
The process for inﬂation follows
 t = (1    (1)) 
 
t +  (L) t 1 +   ,t, (1)
where   ,t   N(0, 2
 ) and  (L)= 1 +  2L + ··· +  pLp 1. This process can
equivalently be represented in companion form as
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where vt   N(0, 2
v).
One interpretation of trend inﬂation is that it represents the private sector’s in-
ference regarding the central bank’s long-term inﬂation objective. One important
point, however, is that the SPF long-term forecasts report the average inﬂation rate
over the next ten years. Given this horizon, a substantial change in the mean SPF
long-term forecast would require forecasters to perceive an important shift in inﬂation
dynamics or a change in any implicit inﬂation objective of the central bank. From this
standpoint, short-run ﬂuctuations in inﬂation or deviations from an estimated policy
rule are unlikely to cause forecasters to sharply reassess their long-term expectations,
especially if the central bank is credibly able to commit to medium and long-term
goals.
The model of survey expectations uses the autoregressive model for inﬂation in
(1) along with the law of iterated expectations. Iterating (1) forward and taking
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which is the conditional value for survey expectations of horizon k, plus noise, that are
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18which arises from measurement and approximation error.19 As the horizon length-
ens, survey expectations will depend more on the inﬂation trend and less on actual
realizations of past inﬂation.
The monetary reaction function is given by
it = r +  
 








+  xxt +  i,t, (5)
where  i,t   N(0, 2
i),  C
t is core CPI inﬂation and xt is the Chicago Fed National
Activity Index (CFNAI). The CFNAI is the ﬁrst principal component of a large set
of economic indicators covering real economic activity and is based on earlier work
by Stock and Watson (1999). The use of the CFNAI as the measure of real activity
relates to work that estimates policy reaction functions using factor analysis, such as
Bernanke and Boivin (2003).
The complete state-space representation is given by
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19Approximation error arises because we assume a diagonal covariance matrix for the innovations
to the measurement equations in the model. Small, non-zero, correlation exists between inﬂation and
survey expectations, since an innovation to inﬂation within a period can cause survey expectations
to move in the same period. However, we estimated a version of this model and found it to have
very minor implications. For comparability to Kozicki and Tinsley (2006), we follow their approach
and shu e this small approximation error into the measurement error on survey expectations.
19 1  2  3  4 r    x
.396   .138 .264   .046 2.240  .621  .375
(.069) (.08) (.093) (.075) (.236) (.203) (.331)
Table 1: Parameter Estimates (* indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level)
where i  {1,2,...,p}.
Estimation is done via maximum likelihood and parameter estimates are given in
Table 1. The sum of the coe cients on lagged inﬂation is .45, indicating the inﬂa-
tion trend is slightly more important in inﬂuencing short-term inﬂation dynamics.20
Estimates for parameters in the monetary reaction function appear plausible. The
constant real rate is 2.24, the federal funds rate responds aggressively and signiﬁ-
cantly to deviations of core CPI inﬂation relative to trend and the coe cient on the
measure of economic activity has the correct sign, but is not signiﬁcant.
The other objects of interest from estimation are trend inﬂation and the Kalman
gains on the forecast errors. Turning ﬁrst to trend inﬂation, Figure 1 reports the
trend for the model given in (6)-(7). Clearly, the trend closely tracks the observed
long-term survey expectation of inﬂation. Figure 2 plots the year-over-year change
in the headline CPI and trend. As noted by Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a,b, 2002),
forecasters’ view of trend inﬂation was slow to change, as is apparent for the ﬁrst
part of the 1980s when inﬂation was persistently below both the long-term survey
measures and trend.
The model generates forecasts of survey expectations that are consistent with
the estimated process for inﬂation and thus, long-term survey expectations provide
a contemporaneous source of information for monitoring the private sector’s view of
trend inﬂation. If long-term survey expectations di er from their forecasted value,
the implication is that forecasters have revised their estimate of trend inﬂation.
To make this point precise, estimation implies that the Kalman gain on forecast
errors on long-term expectations is roughly unity, indicating that long-term survey
expectations basically track trend inﬂation. In some respects, this may appear obvi-
ous. However, this implication not only derives from the cross-equation restrictions
that are imposed on the processes for inﬂation and expectations, but also on the
relative variances of the shocks to long-term expectations and trend inﬂation. The
variance of the inﬂation target is low, but the estimated variance of the innovation
to the long-term survey measure is much lower.
The implication of these relative variances for extracting the underlying inﬂation
trend from long-term survey measures can be drawn from a simple example. For the
20This estimate of the AR coe cient sum is very similar to Kozicki and Tinsley’s (2006).
20moment, let the long-term survey-based measures equal
St|t+40 =  
 
t + ut, (13)
where ut   N(0, 2
u) and St|t+40 is observed, but not   
t or ut. This speciﬁcation is
actually very close to the estimated model, since f40 (C) is near unity and h40,i (C)
are near zero for each i. Given policymakers’ interest lies primarily in deducing   
t,
we can extract its value by specifying a prior mean and variance for   
0, and then
update the inference regarding the trend using the Kalman ﬁlter,
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is the mean square error of the inﬂation trend. In estimating the actual model, the
mean square error for trend inﬂation is low, but  2
u is much lower. Consequently,
the estimated value for the Kalman gain is near unity on forecast errors for long-
term survey expectations. Setting Kt = 1, we see that   
t = St+40|t, indicating
policymakers can track trend inﬂation by focusing on long-term expectations. In
contrast to long-term expectations, forecast errors on inﬂation, the interest rate and
short-term expectations have Kalman gains near zero, so have very little implication
concerning inferences on trend inﬂation.21
However, persistently high inﬂation will eventually feed through to higher short-
term and eventually long-term expectations. Casual evidence from Figure 2 indicates
that expectations of the inﬂation trend do change, but it takes time for forecasters
to adjust their views. More formally, we test the cross-equation restrictions given
by (11) and (12) to assess whether expectations based on the model for inﬂation
given in (1) are a reasonable description of survey expectations. Freely estimating
the parameters in the matrix H (i.e. see (10)) results in a higher likelihood value,
21The result that innovations to the monetary reaction function have little impact on the inference
regarding the underlying inﬂation trend stands in contrast to Kiley (2008b). The di erence could be
a result of a number of factors, such as di erent estimation methods (Kalman ﬁlter vs. GMM), model
(we explicitly model survey expectations) or data (he constructs a 7-year 3-year ahead measure of
expected inﬂation, which he treats as the target). Also, Kiley’s Kalman gain is roughly .02, indicating
a 100 basis point deviation in the rule results in a .02% revision to the underlying inﬂation trend
— so even under his speciﬁcation, short-run deviations from the estimated reaction function play a
limited role in a ecting long-term expectations.
21but does not indicate a formal rejection of the cross-equation restrictions.22 This
suggests the model does captures relevant aspects of the factors driving long-term
survey expectations.
The bottom line of this exercise is that movements in long-term inﬂation expec-
tations are unlikely to be the result of short-run noise, so should be viewed by pol-
icymakers as a reliable indicator of the perceived underlying inﬂation trend. Given
the importance of trend inﬂation to inﬂation dynamics, even small movements in
long-run expectations can then represent a persistent source of pressure on inﬂation.
However, the model for inﬂation in this section is highly restrictive, imposing constant
parameters across the sample. In the next section, we consider a much less restrictive
model that allows for potentially richer interactions among inﬂation and expectations
by letting parameters vary over time.
5 A Time-Varying VAR with Stochastic Volatility
We now turn to a model that not only relaxes the cross-equation restrictions of
the model used in section 4 but also allows time-varying parameters and stochastic
volatility. A key beneﬁt of this approach is that it allows us to distinguish changes in
the contemporaneous relationships among the variables from changes in the volatility
of the shocks. In many respects, this approach swings the pendulum in the opposite
direction relative to the previous model — that is, moving from a highly restrictive
framework to one that imposes few restrictions on the relationships among inﬂation
and expectations.
Because estimation is computationally demanding and may not be reliable in a
large VAR with time-varying parameters, we restrict the number of variables in the
system to include only long-term expectations, short-term expectations, and core
inﬂation. Following studies such as Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Primaceri (2005),
the model also incorporates stochastic volatility.
The model speciﬁcation is as follows




















22We set the weights on the inﬂation trend term - the f4(C) and f40(C) terms - to one minus
the sum of coe cients on the lagged inﬂation terms, which are freely estimated. This relaxes the
cross-equation restrictions, but continues to impose that expectations are a weighted sum of the
inﬂation trend and lags of inﬂation, with the weights summing to one.
22where var( t)=I and now yt =
 
St+40|t,S t+4|t, t
  . The vectors of parameters follow
random walk processes:
Bt = Bt 1 + ut
at = at 1 + vt
loght = loght 1 + et.
Following Benati (2008), we estimate the model chieﬂy with the method of Cogley
and Sargent (2005), except that we allow the elements of A to be time varying, as
in Primaceri (2005). Estimates of a VAR from a training sample of 10 years of data
are used to set key elements of the prior.23 We report posterior estimates based on a
sample of 10,000 draws, obtained by ﬁrst generating 10,000 burn-in draws and then
saving every ﬁfth draw from another 50,000 draws.
To identify the e ects of shocks to each variable, we use a recursive identiﬁcation
scheme with the following ordering: long-term expectations, short-term expectations,
core CPI inﬂation. Survey measures are placed ﬁrst due to the timing of when the
Survey of Professional Forecasters asks forecasters to submit their responses. Typi-
cally, the deadlines are in the middle of the second month of the quarter, which means
forecasters will have seen, at best, CPI data on only the ﬁrst month of the quarter.
Recently, the survey deadlines are somewhat earlier, implying forecasters would not
have any CPI inﬂation data within the quarter that they are submitting their fore-
cast. The timing of the survey then suggests that innovations to inﬂation are unlikely
to impact survey expectations within a given quarter. Long-term expectations are
before short-term expectations since a forecaster revising his/her long-term forecast,
for whatever reason, will also likely revise the short-term forecast. In contrast, a
forecaster suddenly revising his/her short-term forecast may be less likely to revise
the long-term forecast.
Figures 3 and 4 compare posterior medians of impulse responses (with 70 percent
credible sets) implied by coe cient values at the beginning and end of the estima-
tion sample, respectively. Focusing ﬁrst on Figure 3, which reports responses based
on parameter values in 1982:Q3, the ﬁrst column shows a 50 basis point shock to
long-term expectations generates a rise in short-term expectations of roughly equal
magnitude.24 Core inﬂation rises by about 100 basis points a year after the shock and
then dissipates. In the second column, a shock to short-term expectations generates
a temporary rise in long-term expectations with no signiﬁcant pass-through to core
23In this training sample, long-run expectations are proxied by econometric estimates from Kozicki
and Tinsley (2001a), and short-run expectations are measured with SPF forecasts of inﬂation in the
GNP deﬂator. Following Del Negro (2003), we use a more informative prior on the initial coe cient
values, setting the means at values from a VAR(1) and variances equal to twice the OLS variance
of the VAR(4) coe cients, to reduce problems with explosive roots.
24Shocks to expectations in this setting are probably best interpreted as resulting from ‘omitted
fundamentals’ in the VAR, rather than sunspot shocks.
23inﬂation. The last column shows that a shock to core inﬂation elicits a modest and
short-lived rise in short-term expectations that dies out relatively quickly. Figure 4
reports impulses responses based on parameter values in 2008:Q2. The only substan-
tive di erence compared to the responses from early in the sample is that shocks to
short-term expectations no longer impact long-term expectations, as is apparent in
the top graph in the middle column.
Figure 5 compares the posterior medians of impulse responses based on parameter
values at several di erent dates. The responses are remarkably stable, suggesting that
time variation in the autoregressive parameters (i.e. the Bi,t’s) is not a central feature
of the post-1980 relationship between inﬂation and expectations.
Figure 6 reports posterior medians of the time-varying volatilities of the residual
standard deviations. The volatility of shocks (both structural and reduced-form) to
long-term expectations has varied over the sample, but exhibits a pronounced decline
that began in the late 1990s. Volatility in the innovation to short-term expectations
has also steadily trended down. Volatility to the innovation in inﬂation declined
more rapidly than either long- or short-term expectations early in the sample, but
has modestly risen over the past ﬁve years.
In this framework, long-term expectations can be ‘anchored’ in two ways, either
by exhibiting little or no response to movements in inﬂation or having innovations
with low volatility.25 First, expectations are anchored if they are unresponsive to
innovations to core inﬂation and short-term expectations. An innovation to core
inﬂation can lead to a rise in long-term expectations if the central bank passively
accommodates the shock and allows long-term expectations to rise. Similarly, an
innovation to short-term expectations, perhaps due to rising energy or food prices, can
lead to higher long-term expectations if the central bank passively accommodates the
shock. Second, long-term expectations are better anchored following a decline in the
stochastic volatility for the innovation to long-term expectations. Overall, anchored
long-term expectations are then unresponsive to shocks and display a minimal amount
of volatility.
Based on both notions of anchoring, we view long-term expectations as modestly
better anchored in 2008:Q2 than in 1982:Q3. Referring to Figures 3 and 4, long-term
expectations do not respond signiﬁcantly to an innovation to short-term expectations
in 2008:Q2, whereas they rose approximately 10 basis point the few quarters following
the shock in 1982:Q3. However, expectations are not perfectly anchored. Following a
shock to core inﬂation, long-term expectations rise slightly (less than two basis points,
in response to a 50 basis point shock in core inﬂation), with no real di erence in the
response today versus the response in 1982.
25We focus on anchoring of long-term expectations because the SPF requests forecasts for headline
inﬂation. One-year (i.e. short–term) expectations should move in response to ﬂuctuations in energy
and food prices, where such movements do not necessarily indicate expectations are unanchored.
24The second notion of anchoring, which focuses on the volatility in the innovations
to expectations, suggests long-term expectations are better anchored near the end
of the sample. If we can interpret long-term survey expectations as professional
forecasters’ view of trend inﬂation, as the model in the section 4 suggests, then the




The small time-varying VAR is useful for gauging the relationships among inﬂation
and short- and long-term expectations. However, our next step is to move to a richer
multivariate setting that can potentially identify other factors that impact inﬂation
expectations, such as output or certain commodity prices. One drawback is that
expanding the number of variables in a time-varying VAR with stochastic volatility is
very demanding from a computational standpoint and may, if the increase in variables
is great enough, even lead to unreliable estimates. So given the relative stability of
parameter estimates, this section increases the number of variables and moves to a
conventional VAR framework.26
The approach is similar to Leduc, Sill, and Stark (2007), who add eight-month
ahead inﬂation expectations to an otherwise conventional macroeconomic VAR.27 Our
analysis builds on theirs in a few respects. First, we incorporate both short- and long-
term expectations into the VAR. Second, we augment the VAR with either the food
or energy component of the CPI to assess how shocks to these commodity bundles
may impact inﬂation expectations. Finally, we signiﬁcantly extend the data sample,
to end in mid-2008 instead of 2001, and thereby capture more recent behavior.
The benchmark VAR contains ﬁve variables, with four lags of each, in the following
order: long-term expectations, short-term expectations, CPI inﬂation, the Chicago
Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI), and the federal funds rate. We use the CFNAI
because it captures broader movements in economic activity than, say, just industrial
production.
Figure 7 gives the impulse responses for each orthogonalized shock (with 70%
26Since stochastic volatility is an important feature of the data, we perform a robustness check
later in the section by estimating a model with constant autoregressive parameters, but allowing for
stochastic volatility.
27See also Choy, Leong, and Tay (2006), Canova and Gambetti (2008), Demertzis, Marcellino,
and Viegi (2008), and Mehra and Herrington (2008).
25conﬁdence bands). The primary results are as follows.
• Shocks to long-term expectations generate a persistent rise in short- and long-
term expectations. There is some pass-through to inﬂation, though of negligible
signiﬁcance. These results are consistent with the time–varying parameter VAR.
Also, monetary policy tightens aggressively.
• Shocks to short-term expectations also generate a rise in long-term expecta-
tions and generate some temporary pass-through to inﬂation. Monetary policy
temporarily tightens, but less so than under a shock to long-term expectations.
Apart from the behavior of long-term expectations, our estimates are qualita-
tively similar to those of Leduc, Sill, and Stark (2007) for the 1979-2001 period.
• Shocks to inﬂation cause both short- and long-term expectations to rise, where
the impulse to short-run expectations dies out relatively quickly compared to
long-term expectations (although the di erences are probably not statistically
signiﬁcant). Monetary policy eases due to a decline in economic activity. This
shock appears to be capturing primarily ‘supply side’ disturbances.
• Shocks to economic activity elicit a rise in short-term expectations and inﬂation.
Monetary policy aggressively tightens.
• A shock raising the federal funds rate eventually lowers short- and long-term
expectations after about one year, though only temporarily. Inﬂation and eco-
nomic activity also decline temporarily for a few quarters following the shock.
From a qualitative standpoint, the impact on each variable is intuitively rea-
sonable and in line with responses from estimated medium-scale DSGE models,
such as Smets and Wouters (2007). Our estimates are qualitatively similar to
those of Leduc, Sill, and Stark (2007) for 1979-2001, although with less dramatic
responses, probably reﬂecting the di erence in samples. Finally, the response
of each variable has periods where the 70 percent conﬁdence band is outside of
zero, but each is of negligible signiﬁcance.
Some of these results di er from the ﬁrst section — namely that short-run inno-
vations to inﬂation and monetary policy can move both measures of expectations.
There are several potential reasons for this — however, the primary reason is that
the model embedded in the VAR for survey expectations is less restrictive. Expec-
tations in the VAR depend on lagged values of every variable in the system. Also,
there are no cross-equation restrictions requiring expectations be consistent with the
underlying process for inﬂation.
266.2 Augmenting the VAR with Disaggregated Price Data
The benchmark VAR provides some indications of how expectations interact with
other macroeconomic variables. To address more speciﬁcally which factors impact
expectations, we expand the VAR to include sector-speciﬁc price indices that may
impact expectations. In particular, we include either the food or the energy compo-
nent of the CPI index to get a sense for how movement in prices for goods in these
baskets may a ect expectations of future inﬂation.28
The VAR in this section is similar to the benchmark VAR, except for a few mod-
iﬁcations. First, the CPI is now partially disaggregated, so is no longer appropriate
to include both (i) a food or energy price component and (ii) the headline measure
of inﬂation in the system. Instead, we replace headline CPI inﬂation with the core
measure that excludes food and energy. Second, we have expanded the system, so
must take another stand on identiﬁcation. We order the energy or food component
ﬁrst because forecasters will have seen several weeks of data on the underlying com-
modities in these baskets before reporting their forecasts. However, it is reasonable
that energy and food respond to shocks to expectations or economic activity, so we
consider alternatives that ensure our results are robust to alternative orderings.
The estimates in Figure 8 indicate that shocks to CPI energy inﬂation have some
impact on inﬂation expectations. Core inﬂation modestly rises in response, but is not
signiﬁcant, and economic activity temporarily declines. The shock seems to induce
supply-side disturbances typically associated with energy shocks. Policy appears to
balance the negative comovement in inﬂation and economic activity by leaving the
federal funds rate mostly unchanged. Other aspects of the results, such as the im-
pacts of expectations shocks, are similar to those from the benchmark case presented
in section 6.1. However, in unreported results, we have found the responses of expec-
tations to energy price shocks are not robust to alternative orderings, in particular
an ordering of expectations, core inﬂation, energy inﬂation, CFNAI, and the funds
rate. As a consequence, we are hesitant to draw strong conclusions on the impact of
energy price shocks on expectations.
The estimates in Figure 9 provide a more robust ﬁnding: shocks to CPI food
inﬂation generate a relatively large and persistent impact on both short- and long-
term expectations, as well as a signiﬁcant increase in core inﬂation. This pattern
holds up in alternative orderings: ordering food inﬂation after either expectations,
core CPI inﬂation, or the CFNAI made little di erence. One rational as to why food
price inﬂation has a larger impact on expectations and core inﬂation is that energy
is substantially more volatile than food prices. The volatility may cause forecasters
to expect an increase in one quarter will be undone in near-term quarters, so they
28Weighting food and energy price inﬂation by their relative importances in the CPI yields results
very similar to the reported estimates, which use unweighted inﬂation rates.
27place low weight on energy price movements when formulating their expectations
of headline inﬂation. In contrast, food price inﬂation has a tendency to be more
persistent and has a larger weight in the overall CPI basket, causing forecasters to
revise expectations in light of movements in food prices.
6.3 Robustness Checks
• Results from section 5’s time-varying parameter VAR with stochastic volatility
indicate that stochastic volatility is important. To further check our results
from the conventional VAR analysis, we estimate a VAR using the same set of
variables, but allowing for stochastic volatility.29 The speciﬁcation is as follows:





which is similar to (17), except µt and Bi,t are constant for all t. Results com-
pared to the standard VAR are very similar, with one important exception.
In general, there are no signiﬁcant di erences to report regarding impulse re-
sponses relative to the standard VAR. Of interest, however, are some of the
movements in stochastic volatility. Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the dramatic
rise in volatility in food and energy prices over the past several years. There
has also been some rise in the volatility of short-term expectations and core
inﬂation, but volatility still remains low relative to earlier in the sample. The
volatility of long-term expectations remains low in recent years across speciﬁ-
cations. These features are reinforced by using Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent’s
R2 measure, which is the fraction of the conditional to unconditional variance of
the forecast error. Figure 12 plots the R2 measures for each variable and shows
that predictability of long-term expectations has risen, whereas predictability
of overall CPI inﬂation has fallen.
The variance decompositions at a two-year horizon conditional on parameter
values at the beginning and end of the sample are given in Table 2. An interest-
ing aspect of these decompositions is the shift away from variance attributable
to ‘own shocks’ for long-term expectations towards shocks to CPI inﬂation.
Own shocks accounted for 65% of the variance in long-term expectations at the
beginning of the sample, but fell to 23% by the end. CPI shocks, in contrast,
accounted for 9% of variation in long-term expectations at the beginning of
29Fixing the VAR coe cients simpliﬁes the TVP estimation described above. Conditional on the
draw of At and Ht, the VAR coe cients are estimated with a ﬂat prior, which is e ectively equivalent
to GLS estimation (speciﬁcally, the posterior mean and variance are e ectively equivalent to the GLS
estimates; in the Gibbs algorithm, we then take a draw from a normal distribution with mean and
variance equal to the posterior mean and variance). Conditional on the VAR coe cients and Ht,
the elements of At are estimated as in Primaceri (2005). Finally, conditional on the VAR coe cients
and At, the log volatilities are estimated as in Cogley and Sargent (2005).
28the sample and rose to 55% at the end. This implies the long-term expecta-
tions vary more today, in relative terms, in response to observables instead of
unexplained factors. Overall, we can describe the volatility of long-term expec-
tations as showing a substantial decline over the sample, where the volatility
that remains is primarily explained by observable macroeconomic variables.
Table 2. Variance decomposition from baseline VAR with stochastic
volatility, horizon of 8 quarters
shock to:
response of: EXP10YR EXP1YR CPI CFNAI FFR
based on 1982:Q3 volatilities
EXP10YR 65 (19.9) 8 (9.5) 9 (9.4) 3 (4.1) 15 (16.3)
EXP1YR 26 (15.8) 41 (18.2) 5 (5.4) 10 (9.4) 18 (16.6)
CPI 9 (7.7) 18 (13.3) 37 (18.4) 9 (8.7) 27 (18.4)
CFNAI 8 (7.0) 17 (13.7) 10 (9.8) 34 (17.4) 31 (22.1)
FFR 10 (9.5) 6 (7.4) 5 (6.6) 30 (17.5) 49 (20.9)
based on 2008:Q2 volatilities
EXP10YR 23 (17.8) 10 (10.9) 55 (23.2) 4 (5.5) 8 (10.6)
EXP1YR 7 (7.2) 44 (18.4) 29 (18.3) 12 (10.9) 7 (8.6)
CPI 1 (1.1) 7 (6.8) 84 (10.3) 4 (4.8) 4 (4.8)
CFNAI 2 (2.5) 15 (12.6) 36 (19.4) 36 (18.4) 12 (11.9)
FFR 3 (3.7) 9 (9.9) 19 (17.4) 46 (20.6) 24 (16.3)
Notes:
1. Entries are posterior mean estimates of variance shares, in percent terms, with posterior standard
deviations in parentheses.
• The impact of food on expectations is relatively robust to whether it is split
between “food away from home” and “food at home.” In general, the di erent
indices have impacts similar to the overall food component. There is some
sensitivity to whether food at home is ordered before or after food away from
home (whichever is ﬁrst has the bigger impact on expectations and inﬂation),
but qualitatively, the results are similar across orderings.
• Adding wages, whether hourly earnings or compensation for the non-farm busi-
ness sector, did not generate any meaningful results. That is, there is no clear
evidence that wages and expectations of inﬂation react to one another.
• Using the University of Michigan’s consumer survey instead of SPF expecta-
tions yields results that are similar along most dimensions, although di erent
in some. Not surprisingly, shocks to consumer expectations are bigger and are
less persistent, primarily because the University of Michigan series are noisier
29than the SPF series. Shocks to 1-year expectations don’t cause 10-year expec-
tations to rise, and policy is measured as responding to 1-year but not 10-year
expectations shocks.
• Using a model in the change in long-term expectations, short-term expecta-
tion less long-term expectations, and inﬂation less long-term expectations, and
then adding back the long-terms levels to recover responses in levels yields sim-
ilar results. The exception is that expectation shocks and responses are more
persistent, as expected given the enforced unit root.
• Using PCE inﬂation instead of the CPI yields qualitatively similar results, with
one noticeable di erence being that a shock to 1-year (CPI) expectations has
less impact on PCE inﬂation than CPI inﬂation.
6.4 VAR results summary
Relatively unrestricted VARs estimated with data for about the past 25 years indicate
that shocks to expectations — long-run more so than short-run — have a signiﬁcant
impact on inﬂation. It appears that policy responses to shocks to expectations likely
help to mitigate the impact of the shocks to expectations. Expectations appear to
respond to a variety of other shocks in the economy: to actual inﬂation, food price
inﬂation, economic activity, and monetary policy. So neither inﬂation nor expecta-
tions appear to be perfectly anchored. Of course, we shouldn’t expect inﬂation and
short-term expectations to not respond (at least temporarily) to shocks. We might
instead focus on whether long-run expectations respond to shocks. While long-run
expectations are clearly not perfectly anchored, at least the responses of long-run
expectations to the shocks we consider are quantitatively small.
7 Conclusions
We conclude by providing summary answers — drawn from our literature review and
our own evidence drawn from a range of empirical models — to the key questions of
the paper.
1. How do expectations inﬂuence inﬂation? Do the roles of short-run and long-run
expectations di er?
• Overall, expectations are an important force in inﬂation dynamics, with
long-run expectations, which are tantamount to trend inﬂation, more im-
portant than short-run expectations.
30• A wide range of prior studies has found a key role for survey-based ex-
pectations in inﬂation dynamics. While there remains some debate about
the importance of forward-looking expectations versus backward-looking
components in inﬂation dynamics, expectations or trend inﬂation appear
to be a primary source of variation in inﬂation. Apart from the results in
this paper, there is little direct evidence on distinct roles of short-term vs.
long-term expectations.
• In our initial state-space framework, trend inﬂation, which is essentially
equivalent to the long-run inﬂation expectation, receives greater weight
in the equation determining short-run inﬂation dynamics than lagged re-
alizations of inﬂation. As a result, even small movements in long-run
expectations can represent a persistent source of pressure on inﬂation.
• In our VAR estimates, shocks to short- and long-term expectations re-
sult in some pass-through to actual inﬂation. The pass-through is greater
for a shock to long-term expectations, despite a sustained increase in the
nominal federal funds rate.
2. What inﬂuences expectations? That is, how do expectations depend on past
inﬂation, the state of the economy, and monetary policy? How do long-run
expectations relate to short-run expectations?
• Existing research indicates that inﬂation expectations respond to a range
of variables: oil prices, commodity prices, past inﬂation, the state of the
economy, and monetary policy actions. A more limited volume of work
shows that the responses of short-run expectations are normally sharper
than the responses of long-run expectations. Long-run expectations closely
track trend inﬂation, which tends to respond with a lag to actual inﬂation.
• In our VAR analysis, innovations to CPI inﬂation pose the greatest risk to
keeping short- and long-term expectations anchored. Short-term expecta-
tions respond more sharply than do long-term expectations. Also, shocks
to the interest rate play a role, though more modest.
• In our VAR analysis of sector-speciﬁc prices, shocks to energy have little
e ect on core inﬂation, despite potentially having some impact on inﬂation
expectations (in some identiﬁcations). In contrast, shocks to the food
component signiﬁcantly a ect expectations and core inﬂation.
3. What’s changed over time? Have the relationships among inﬂation and expec-
tations changed in recent years, making inﬂation and expectations more or less
anchored? What might account for any changes?
• The existing literature suggests inﬂation has been better anchored in the
past 20 or so years than in the prior period, although some evidence sug-
gests no change. Similarly, some historical comparisons generally suggest
31expectations have become better (but not completely) anchored, respond-
ing less than used to be the case to various shocks in the economy.
• Most strikingly, the volatility of expectations and trend inﬂation has clearly
fallen, and some evidence indicates that trend inﬂation has become a rela-
tively smaller source of volatility in inﬂation. While these changes imply a
smaller role for trends and long-run expectations in inﬂation movements,
they are consistent with improved anchoring of inﬂation.
• Of the limited work to date on the sources of these changes, most has
focused on explaining the changes in the properties of inﬂation (not expec-
tations) with shifts in the behavior of monetary policy. Some studies have
found that the reduced volatility and persistence of inﬂation is mostly due
to a fallo  in the volatility of an implicit inﬂation target. Others attribute
changes in the behavior of inﬂation more to other changes in the behavior
of monetary policy. Still other studies highlight the importance of learning
by the public or the central bank in inﬂation dynamics and changes over
time in dynamics.
• Our own estimates, based on data for the past 25 or so years and mod-
els with time-varying parameters, suggest changes within this sample have
been modest (some of the changes mentioned above occurred before the
beginning of our sample). The only notable change is that long-run expec-
tations seem to have become somewhat better anchored, partly in the sense
that they are now slightly less responsive to inﬂation shocks than used to
be the case but mostly in the sense that the volatility of shocks to long-
run expectations has fallen sharply. The volatilities of shocks to short-run
expectations and core inﬂation also fell sharply during our sample.
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Figure 1: Trend Inﬂation and Long-term Survey Expectations



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 12: R-squared Measures from VAR with Stochastic Volatility
48